The Current State of SPS and TBT Agreements in International Trade

Every time a shipment of fresh produce, processed food, or livestock product crosses an international border, it enters a complex web of rules designed to answer one fundamental question: is this safe? The Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement – both administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) – are the two cornerstone frameworks that govern this question at the global level. Introduced in 1995 as part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, these agreements have shaped international food safety and quality standards for three decades. Today, they remain as relevant – and as contested – as ever.

What the SPS and TBT agreements actually do 🔗

At their core, the two agreements serve distinct but complementary purposes. The SPS Agreement governs measures that countries use to protect human, animal, and plant life or health from risks associated with the spread of pests, diseases, contaminants, and toxins in food and agricultural trade. This includes pesticide residue limits, quarantine requirements, inspection procedures, and food additive regulations. The TBT Agreement, on the other hand, covers the broader universe of technical regulations and standards – from product labeling and packaging specifications to quality certifications and conformity assessment procedures – for both food and non-food goods.

The key principle underlying both agreements is that health and safety measures must be science-based, non-discriminatory, and no more trade-restrictive than necessary. The SPS Agreement allows WTO members to set their own standards on food safety and animal and plant health, but these standards must be based on science, applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail. The TBT Agreement mirrors this logic by prohibiting technical regulations that create unnecessary obstacles to trade, while recognising WTO members’ right to implement measures to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of human health and safety, or protection of the environment.

How the two agreements overlap 🔗

In practice, SPS and TBT measures frequently apply to the same product simultaneously. A food product might be subject to SPS measures regarding pesticide residue limits while simultaneously being subject to TBT measures for nutritional labeling requirements. Technical barriers to trade and SPS measures make up the core of non-tariff measures (NTMs) both within the multilateral trade policy regime, administrated by the WTO, and within the preferential trade policy regime, represented by preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Since tariffs have steadily declined over the decades, non-tariff measures like SPS and TBT requirements have become the primary friction point in agricultural and food trade.

The role of international standard-setting bodies 🔗

A cornerstone of both agreements is harmonization – aligning national regulations with internationally recognized standards to minimize conflicts and trade disputes. The SPS Agreement identifies three key international standard-setting bodies whose work serves as benchmarks: the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety, the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) for animal health, and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant protection.

The Codex Alimentarius Commission holds a particularly central role. When countries base their regulations on Codex standards, they are less likely to face legal challenges under WTO rules. Both agreements also emphasize transparency: governments must notify the WTO of any new or modified regulations that could affect trade, and they must establish inquiry points so that other member countries can request information about existing or proposed measures.

The current landscape: ongoing reforms and record activity 🔗

Three decades after their entry into force, both agreements continue to evolve in response to new trade realities. WTO members adopted the Sixth Review of the Operation and Implementation of the SPS Agreement at a meeting of the SPS Committee in March 2025, also noting a record high number of SPS notifications from developing economies in 2024, which accounted for about 75% of all notifications. This milestone reflects growing engagement with the agreements’ transparency mechanisms, but it also signals the rising complexity of managing food safety standards across an increasingly interconnected global food system.

On the TBT side, the Tenth Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the TBT Agreement was completed at the November 2024 meeting of the TBT Committee. These regular reviews are significant because they allow member countries to take stock of how well the agreements are functioning and where reforms are needed. The Sixth SPS Review shed light on ways to define, identify and characterize SPS-related emerging risks that pose a threat to food safety, human, plant or animal life or health, and the development and implementation of new agricultural technologies to address emerging risks, as well as the barriers to their successful implementation.

Disputes remain a persistent feature of the system. From the establishment of the WTO in 1995 until the end of 2024, members have raised a total of 598 specific trade concerns in SPS Committee meetings. These concerns span a wide range of issues, from pesticide residue standards and maximum residue limits to import bans on specific agricultural products – many of which remain unresolved for years.

The protectionism problem: when safety rules become trade barriers 🔗

One of the most persistent and difficult challenges in this space is distinguishing legitimate health regulations from disguised protectionism. The SPS Agreement was designed specifically to address this risk. Because sanitary and phytosanitary measures can so effectively restrict trade, GATT member governments were concerned about the need for clear rules regarding their use, as the Uruguay Round objective to reduce other possible barriers to trade increased fears that such measures might be used for protectionist purposes.

Despite WTO rules and member commitments, some agricultural producers and policymakers continue to be concerned that trading partners may be using SPS and TBT measures as disguised protectionism to restrict trade in ways that constitute non-tariff barriers. This separation has given way for some countries to cloak protectionism under SPS measures, thereby affecting legitimate international free trade and negating the WTO’s fundamental principles.

Emerging technologies have added a new dimension to this debate. With the emergence of gene editing and advanced farming methods, countries with strict regulatory measures against GMOs could argue that even slight modifications of genes are a cause for SPS concern, thus raising technical barriers to trade. Farming techniques such as vertical farming and hydroponics may also face SPS concerns in some jurisdictions. As the scientific consensus on new agricultural technologies evolves, the line between precaution and protectionism becomes harder to draw.

The developing country dilemma 🔗

Perhaps the most significant tension in the current SPS and TBT landscape is the unequal burden these agreements place on developing and least-developed countries (LDCs). In theory, both agreements benefit all countries equally – rules apply regardless of a country’s economic strength. Developing countries benefit because the rules apply irrespective of their political and economic strength or technological capacity, and they can use the SPS Agreement as a tool to gain market access for their exports.

In practice, however, compliance is far from equal. Although essential for food safety and environmental protection, SPS measures often function as non-tariff barriers, particularly in developing countries, with compliance with the rules imposing excessive costs on exporters and importers and limiting market access. The costs of risk assessments, the stringency of standards in importing countries, and even the costs of conflict resolution can be too high for developing countries, putting unfair pressure on them and preventing them from fairly accessing the advantages that standards are meant to provide.

Research confirms this asymmetry. Studies have found that SPS and TBT measures significantly reduce exports from developing to developed countries, with considerable variation in impact across different industries and regions. Smaller producers face a particular disadvantage: the need to meet SPS requirements often results in additional costs such as testing, certification, and compliance verification, which can be particularly burdensome for smaller producers or exporters from low-income countries.

Special and differential treatment: the ongoing push for equity 🔗

The WTO has recognized this imbalance and taken steps to address it. At the 13th Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi, ministers adopted the Declaration on the Precise, Effective and Operational Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) Provisions of the SPS and TBT Agreements, which calls for improvements in training, technical assistance, and transparency-related matters to help developing and least developed country members.

The Sixth Review recommendations include a mentoring programme to help interested developing economies engage on SPS matters, continued collaboration with the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the IPPC, and WOAH, and further dialogue on topics including modern challenges, emerging risks, innovative approaches, and digital tools. The Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) – a joint initiative of the WTO, WHO, World Bank, WOAH, and FAO – continues to fund capacity-building projects in developing regions to help countries meet international SPS standards without being shut out of export markets.

Environmental and sustainability concerns 🔗

A newer dimension of the SPS-TBT debate involves environmental and sustainability standards. As importing countries introduce stricter eco-labeling requirements, carbon footprint disclosures, and deforestation regulations, questions arise about whether these measures fall under the TBT Agreement’s scope and whether they constitute legitimate environmental policy or de facto trade barriers. The SPS chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, for instance, reinforces WTO rules and aims to enhance transparency in the Asia-Pacific region, potentially reducing trade barriers over time, while SPS and TBT regulations in high-income countries can also stimulate exports from low and middle income countries when bilateral cooperation is strong. The challenge is ensuring that sustainability-driven regulations don’t inadvertently lock out producers from countries with fewer resources to meet rising green standards.

Why compliance still matters – and what it takes 🔗

Despite its tensions and limitations, adherence to SPS and TBT standards remains a practical necessity for any country seeking meaningful access to global agricultural markets. Non-compliance is not just a legal risk – it results in direct export losses, product rejections, and reputational damage that can take years to recover from.

The trade-restrictive effects of SPS measures can diminish over time as exporters become more familiar with the requirements and treatments, highlighting the importance of regional cooperation and continuous policy attention to balance health protection and fair trade practices. Countries that invest in food safety infrastructure, laboratory capacity, and regulatory alignment with international standards consistently see improved market access outcomes.

The FAO actively supports member countries in building these capabilities, providing technical assistance in food quality systems including HACCP implementation, plant protection, and animal health – all of which directly feed into SPS compliance capacity. Similarly, the TBT Agreement’s transparency provisions are designed to give exporters advance warning of new regulations, so they can adapt before measures take effect rather than being caught off-guard at the border.

The path forward: reform, not replacement 🔗

There is broad agreement among trade experts and policymakers that the SPS and TBT frameworks, while imperfect, provide an irreplaceable structure for governing food safety in global trade. The debates are not about dismantling these agreements but about making them work more equitably and effectively. Working towards the integration of risk assessment and standard setting, and improving cooperation between international organizations such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission and national regulatory authorities, are among the most practical steps forward. Simplifying the process for equivalence findings – where countries demonstrate that their standards offer the same level of protection as those of a trading partner – could also substantially reduce unnecessary duplication of compliance costs.

As global food systems face new stresses from climate change, zoonotic disease emergence, and rapid agricultural innovation, the SPS and TBT agreements will need to keep pace. The record participation in recent WTO committee reviews, and the record number of notifications from developing countries in 2024, suggest that engagement with these frameworks is growing – a positive sign, even as the hard work of reform continues.

What do you think? Do you believe the current SPS and TBT frameworks genuinely provide a level playing field for developing country exporters, or do they inadvertently entrench the advantages of wealthier nations? And as new agricultural technologies like gene editing and precision fermentation reshape food production, how should international trade rules be updated to reflect the science – without opening the door to new forms of disguised protectionism?

References

1. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_e.htm
2. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm
3. https://wto.org/tbt
4. https://www.fao.org/4/w7638e/w7638e06.htm